Abstract. We analyze 2-terminal routing games with linear cost functions and with unknown number of active players. We deal with both splittable and unsplittable models. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric safety-level equilibrium in such games and show that in many cases every player benefits from the common ignorance about the number of players. Furthermore, we prove new theorems on existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in 2-terminal convex routing games with complete information.
Introduction
The study of congestion games [20, 17, 14] is central to game theory, transportation engineering, multi-agent systems, CS/AI, electronic commerce, and communication networks. In the last decade congestion games have been a central ingredient in the border of the above disciplines. 4 Most of the related studies assume complete information about the set (and in particular the number) of participants in the system. 5 However, in many settings, although the set of registered/potential participants may be known, the actual set of active participants is unknown. Hence, incorporating uncertainty about the set of actual participants into congestion settings is a desirable task.
A routing game is defined by a congestion network and a set of players. A congestion network consists of a directed graph, a vector of edge cost functions, and a set of source-target pairs. Each player is associated with a source-target pair. Every player has to move one unit of good from her source to her target. In a splittable routing game, the player can split her unit amongst the paths that connect the source to the target, and in an unsplittable routing game the players cannot split their units. The edge cost functions determine the cost of every user of the edge as a function of the number of users. Routing games are a special type of congestion games. 6 In this paper we focus on routing games that are determined by two-terminal congestion networks. That is, there is a single source-target pair, which is associated with all users. From [13] it can derived that every symmetric congestion game is a 2-terminal routing game. 7 In this paper, when dealing with splittable routing games we assume that the edge cost functions are increasing, continuously differentiable, and convex. When dealing with unsplittable routing games we assume only that they are non-decreasing. In a routing game with complete information every player knows the network structure, the cost functions, and the number of users. In a routing game with incomplete information discussed in this paper, every active player knows all of the above except for the number of active players; she does know the number of potential players. 8 In this paper we assume that there is no commonly known prior probability distribution over the possible number of active players. Hence we suggest to model behavior of the players in these games by the concept of safety-level equilibrium, which was recently defined for games with incomplete information in [1] . A safety-level equilibrium is a strategy profile in which each agent minimizes her worst case cost over all possible states of the environment, assuming the other agents stick to their prescribed strategies. In the context of routing games discussed in this paper, the possible states of the environment correspond to the possible sets of active players. A useful observation is that the worst case cost for a player occurs when all players are active. This follows since the edge cost functions are non-decreasing. Let c(k) be the cost of each player in equilibrium in the complete information case when there are k players, and c(k, n) be the cost of each player in a safety-level equilibrium in the related game with incomplete information when there are k active players and n potential players. We define the value of ignorance to be ν(k, n) = c(k) − c(k, n). If this value is non-negative, ignorance is beneficial (in the weak sense) for the players. 9 In order for the above index of the value of ignorance to make sense the cost in equilibrium at each of the above settings should be uniquely defined. Therefore, parts of this paper are devoted to proving existence and uniqueness of equilibrium results. While analysis of the value of ignorance is performed only for congestion networks with linear cost functions, our existence and uniqueness theorem are proved for more general cost functions.
Our results concerning the value of ignorance in models with linear cost functions are as follows: Fix the number, k ≥ 1, of active players. We show the following structure of the function ν(k, n) for k ≤ n < ∞: In symmetric splittable routing games: ν(k, n) is non-negative and non-decreasing in n at the interval [k, 2k − 1], and it is nonincreasing in n at the interval [2k − 1, ∞). More refined structure is proved for the subclass of splittable parallel routing games: if k is sufficiently large, it is proved that ν(k, n) ≥ 0 for k < n ≤ k(k + 1) − 1, and it vanishes at n = k(k + 1) − 1. Consequently, for n > k(k + 1) − 1, the value of ignorance is not positive. That is, knowledge is a desirable good. Finally, we prove for unsplittable parallel routing games: For sufficiently large k, ν(k, n) ≥ 0 for every n > k, and it is maximized over n ∈ [k, ∞) at n = 2k − 1.
Our results have interesting implications in the context of protocol design in congestion settings with incomplete information. Consider an organizer who knows the number of participants at each given point, and wishes to maximize social surplus. That is, the organizer's goal is to minimize the agents' costs. In ranges in which the value of ignorance is positive (e.g., when the number of potential participants is not too large with respect to the number of active participants) the organizer should not reveal the number of actual participants. Analogously, in ranges in which the value of ignorance is negative the organizer should reveal the number of actual participants. Note that if the costs are paid to a revenue-maximizing organizer, the above policies should be reversed.
The paper is organized as follows: sections 2-4 are devoted to the analysis of 2-terminal splittable routing games with complete information. In Sections 5-6 we analyze the value of ignorance in 2-terminal splittable routing games. In Section 7 we analyze parallel unsplittable routing games (which we call resource selection games) with complete information, and in Section 8 we discuss the value of ignorance for such games.
Congestion Networks
A congestion network consists of a directed graph, a set of sourcetarget pairs, and a vector of edge cost functions. In this paper we deal only with 2-terminal congestion networks, i.e. congestion networks which posses a single source-target pair.
2-Terminal Congestion Networks
Let G = (V, E, v s , v t ) be a 2-terminal directed graph without selfloops, where V is a finite set of nodes, E is a finite set of edges, and v s , v t ∈ V are two distinct nodes called the source node and the target node, respectively. For every v ∈ V we denote by Out(v) and In(v) the set of out-going and in-coming edges of v, respectively. A route is a directed path with distinct nodes that connects v s to v t . For every edge e ∈ E and a route R we write e ∈ R whenever e is part of the route R. Let RO be the set of routes. We assume that RO = ∅.
Every edge e ∈ E is associated with a cost function d e : → which, unless we say otherwise, satisfies the following properties:
-d e is continuously differentiable, convex, increasing, and d e (x) > 0 for every x > 0.
d
e (x) is interpreted as the cost per unit that is moved through e when the load on e is x.
11 A congestion network is called linear if for every edge e there exist constants a e , b e such that d e (x) = a e x+b e for every e ∈ E and for every x ∈ . Obviously, in a linear cost function satisfying the above conditions a e > 0 and b e ≥ 0 for every e ∈ E. Much of the literature on congestion networks deals with linear congestion networks. In addition to its mathematical convenience, this type of assumption is quite natural in settings in which the cost function captures the delay on an edge; the assumption that the delay on edge is a linear function of the load is quite intuitive. Let d = (d e ) e∈E be the vector of edge cost functions. The tuple
The study of parallel congestion networks is most popular in the literature. One reason for that is the fact they capture the classical situation of alternative resources that can be chosen from by a set of parties, each of which having its own job/task. This is the canonical situation studied in Operations Research and related communities.
Route Flows and Edge Flows
Consider an agent who has to move a continuously divisible unit of good from the source to the target. A splitting policy for such an agent is therefore a function g : RO → [0, 1] with R∈RO g(R) = 1. That is, for every route R, g(R) is interpreted as the proportion of the unit sent through the route R. Such a splitting policy is also called a route flow. For every route flow g and for every e ∈ E let f e g = R∈RO|e∈R g(R). That is, f e g is the number of units routed through e. It is well-known that for every route flow g the following two conditions hold for the vector f = (f e ) e∈E = (f e g ) e∈E :
10 In this paper we call increasing what other may call strictly increasing. 11 The values of d e (x) for x < 0 are not relevant to any of our discussions, but it is technically useful to let d e be defined over the whole real line.
where
Every vector f = (f e ) e∈E that satisfies the above two conditions is called an edge flow, and f g is called the edge flow induced by the route flow g. The set of route flows is denoted by ∆(RO), and the set of edge flows is denoted by F . Hence every route flow g ∈ ∆(RO) induces an edge flow f g ∈ F , but it is obvious, and well-known that not every edge flow is induced by some route flow. A sufficient condition for an edge flow to be induced by a route flow is given below. A cycle in G is a simple closed directed path. Let f be an edge flow, and let C be a cycle. We say that C is positive with respect to f if f e > 0 for every e ∈ C. Lemma 1. Let N be a 2-terminal congestion network. Every flow f with no positive cycles is induced by some route flow.
Proof. The proof follows from a more general theorem, named the flow decomposition theorem (see e.g. [2] ).
Note that an edge flow may be induced by several distinct route flows.
Equilibrium in 2-Terminal Splittable Routing Games with Complete Information
Let N = (G, d) be a 2-terminal congestion network, and let I be a nonempty finite set of players. Whenever it is convenient and harmless we assume that I = {1, · · · , n}, n ≥ 1. We are about to define actions and cost functions in the corresponding 2-terminal splittable routing game denoted by Γ N (I). In this game, every player i chooses a route flow g i , and thus a route flow profile g = (g 1 , g 2 , · · · , g n ) ∈ ∆(RO) I is generated. Each such profile of route flows generates a profile of edge flows,
The cost function of every player, c i (g) would depend on the profile of edge flows f g via the formula
where C i : F I → is a function defined over profiles of edge flows as follows:
for every e ∈ E.
A route flow profile g is in equilibrium in Γ N (I) if
for every player i and for every route flow h i , where g −i denotes the profile of route flows of all players but i.
In the following theorem we show that every 2-terminal splittable routing game possesses an equilibrium. We further show that although the game may have multiple equilibria, the concept of equilibrium cost is well-defined. That is, there exists a level of cost c(n) such that in every equilibrium profile g in Γ N (I), every player pays c(n). That is, c i (g) = c(n) for every player i.
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Theorem 1. Let N = (G, d) be a 2-terminal congestion network, let n be a positive integer, and let I be a set of n players. Proof. It is useful to extend the splittable routing game to a game in which the players can choose edge flows directly. In this game, which we call the edge flow splittable routing game and denote it bỹ Γ N (I), every player is able to choose an edge flow rather then just a route flow. Hence, the action set of every player is F , and the cost function of player i is given in (3). It was proved in Theorem 5 in [16] that there exists a unique equilibrium inΓ N (I). Obviously every permutation of this equilibrium profile is also an equilibrium implying that the unique equilibrium must be symmetric. In order to complete the proof of the theorem we have to relate route equilibrium profiles in the splittable routing game Γ N (I) to the unique edge equilibrium profile inΓ N (I).
Let f an equilibrium inΓ N (I). Since the edge cost functions are positive in (0, ∞) every edge flow f i does not contain a positive cycle. Therefore by Lemma 1 f i is induced by some route flow g i . Finally, observe that if g ∈ ∆(RO)
I is an equilibrium in Γ N (I) then f g is an equilibrium profile inΓ N (I).
Equilibrium in 2-Terminal Splittable Routing
Games with an Unknown Set of Active Players
Splittable routing games with unknown active players, are pre-Bayesian games as discussed in [3] and [1] . In this paper we don't use the general concept but rather use the concept in our particular setup. Let N be a 2-terminal congestion network, and let I = {1, 2, · · · , n} be a finite set of potential players.
Terminology: During our discussion we will deal with splittable routing games of the form Γ N (K), where K ⊆ I is a nonempty subset of players. The cost function of player i ∈ K at this game should be denoted by c K i . However, with a slight abuse of notation we will denote it by c k i , where k = |K|. In addition, whenever the set of players and their number is clear we may also omit the superscript k.
A state is a nonempty subset of players, K. That is, the set of states is Ω = 2 I \ {∅}. The set of active players at the state K is K. An active player knows that he is active, but he does not know the true state. Hence, an active player does not know who or how many players are active. All such a player knows is an upper bound on the number of active players, determined by the number of potential players. In a 2-terminal splittable routing game with unknown active players, denoted by H N (I), at every state K the players in K are playing the game Γ N (K), but they do not know it. A strategy for every potential player i in H N (I) is a route flow g i , which he will use once he is active. Note however, that an active player cannot compute his cost even if he knows the complete route flow profile g = (g i ) n i=1 . All he knows is that he will get c k i (g K ) if the set of active players is K, where g K = (g i ) i∈K . When players are considering worst-case scenarios regarding the missing information about the set of active players, and they are in equilibrium, they form a safety-level equilibrium as defined in [1] .
Formally, in our context, a profile of route flows g is a safety level equilibrium in H N (I) if for every player i the minimal value of max {K⊆I|i∈K} c
Since all cost functions are increasing the worst case scenario, that is max {K⊆I|i∈K} c k i (h i , g K\{i} ), is obtained in state K = I. Therefore, we obtain the following result:
) be a 2-terminal congestion network, and let I be a finite set of players. Let g ∈ ∆(RO)
I be a route flow profile. g is a safety-level equilibrium in the associated routing game with incomplete information H N (I) if and only if g is an equilibrium in the associated game with complete information Γ N (I).
Proof. Assume g ∈ ∆(RO)
I is an equilibrium in Γ N (I). Let i be an active player. By the comment we made before the statement of this lemma,
Because g is an equilibrium in Γ N (I), the min in the right-handside of Equation 4 is attained at g i . Therefore, g is a safety-level equilibrium in H N (I). An analogous argument proves the if part of the lemma.
Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 imply that when there are n potential players and k active players, each of the active players is using at every safety-level equilibrium a route flow that induces the edge flow f [n], which is the edge flow induced in equilibrium in the complete information game with n players. Let c(k, n) be the actual cost of each of the active k players when each of them is using f [n]. That is, for an arbitrary player i,
The Value of Ignorance -Splittable Games
We proceed to analyze the value of ignorance in 2-terminal splittable routing games as a function of the relationship between the number of active participants, k, and the number of potential participants, n.
Consider a 2-terminal congestion network N = (G, d), and the associated splittable routing game with unknown active players, H N (I), where |I| = n. Suppose that the real state of the world is K where |K| = k and k < n. If this state is commonly known then each player i ∈ K pays c(k). If the real state is unknown then every active player pays c(k, n) as defined at the end of the previous section. Therefore it is natural to call the difference, c(k) − c(k, n) the value of ignorance. We denote the value of ignorance by ν(k, n). That is,
The value of ignorance indicates how much players "enjoy" the ignorance about the actual set of players. Observe that ignorance is beneficial (in a weak sense) for the players if and only if ν(k, n) ≥ 0. In the following example we demonstrate the value of ignorance in a parallel routing game. . We next find the equilibrium in the splittable routing game with complete information with three players. Assuming the total amount two players send in the upper edge is y ≥ 0, then the third player's objective is to minimize x(x + y) + (1 − x)(1 − x + 2 − y + 1), where x is the amount she will send on the upper edge. The solution to this is x = 5−2y 4
. By the symmetry of the induced edge flow profile in equilibrium we obtain x = 5−4x 4
and therefore x = 5 8 . If the state K is not known to the players, then by playing the safety-level equilibrium each of the players in K will send 5 8 in the upper edge an therefore their costs will be c(2, 3) = . Hence the value of ignorance is ν(2, 3) = In Example 1 we showed that the value of ignorance may be positive. In our next results we show a rich class of games in which this phenomenon occurs. In the next section we proceed to estimate the value of ignorance in linear splittable routing games in general 2-terminal congestion networks. More refined results will be obtained in the section following it for parallel networks.
Linear 2-Terminal Splittable Routing Games
The following is our main result for splittable routing games: Theorem 2. Let N = (G, d) be a linear 2-terminal congestion network. Let k, n ≥ 1 be integers. If 2k − 1 ≥ n > k then ν(k, n) ≥ 0, and ν(k, n − 1) ≤ ν(k, n). Moreover, if there exists an edge e for which f e [n] admits at least two different values at the interval n ∈ [k, 2k − 1], the above inequalities are strict.
The key to the proof of Theorem 2 is Lemma 3 below. Recall that f [n] is the unique edge flow equilibrium profile in Γ N (I). In this Lemma we show that if there are n ≥ 1 players and these players are restricted to use the same edge flow, then the cost is minimized when all player use the edge flow f [2n − 1]. First we need some preparations. Let n ≥ 1 and t ≥ 1. We consider the following two optimization problems, P R i,n and SY M t . In P R i,n there are n players, and player i optimizes her cost (chooses an edge flow) given that all other players but i use the edge flow f [n]. Formally, In (SY M ) t there are t ≥ 1 players, and the objective is to minimize the cost of some arbitrary player, say i, given that all players are restricted to choose the same edge flow (not necessarily an equilibrium flow). Formally,
The following lemma is a key in our proof of Theorem 2. We show that if there are t players for some t ≥ 1, and all players are restricted to use the same edge flow then the optimal cost will be attained
The lemma also provides a useful and related inequality. Lemma 3 and its proof are in the spirit of Lemma 4.3 in [18] . 13 The proof idea is as follows. Suppose there are n ≥ 1 players. Since by Theorem 1 (f [n] , . . . , f [n]) is the unique edge flow equilibrium, f [n] optimizes for i the cost in problem P R i,n . Therefore, the cost for i in the second optimization is lower or equal than the cost for i in the first optimization problem. Both problems are convex optimization problems, and as it turns out the KKT conditions of these two optimization problems are very similar also due to the linearity of the cost functions. The relation between the KKT conditions yields our result.
Lemma 3. Let N = (G, d) be a linear congestion network and let
for every integer k ≥ 1.
Proof. We need some preparations. Recall that an edge flow is a vector f ∈ R E that satisfies conditions (1) and (2). However, the right-hand-side of (3) is well-defined for every vector indexed by the edges. This enables us to extend the cost functions C i to (
The marginal cost of each user i ∈ I on the edge e with respect to f e i is
We further need the following notation. For every fictitious edge flow profile f and every couple of reals α, β ∈ let
As the objective function in P R i,n is convex, and all constraints are defined by linear inequalities and equalities, P R i,n is a convex minimization problem with linear constraints.
Therefore by KKT theorem in Section 10, necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality are provided by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Thus, f i ∈ F is an optimal solution for P R i,n if and only if there exist Lagrange multipliers λ v i , v ∈ V such that for every edge e ∈ E:
) ≥ 0, and
wheret(e) andĥ(e) are the tail and head nodes of the edge e respectively, f −i = (f [n] , . . . , f [n]), and
As d e (x) = a e x + b e , and I = {1, ..., n},
. (7) By Theorem 1, (f [n] , ..., f [n]) is the unique edge flow profile induced by every route flow equilibrium. Therefore, for f i = f [n] there exist Lagrange multipliers λ v , v ∈ V such that for all e ∈ E:
(n + 1)a e f e [n] + b e + λt (e) − λĥ (e) ≥ 0, and
Note that we have dropped the subscript i as for every player j the same conditions are drawn for P R j,n .
14 Similarly, by the KKT Theorem in Section (10), f ∈ F is an optimal solution for (SY M ) t if and only if there exist Lagrange multipliers λ u , u ∈ V such that for every edge e ∈ E: 2ta e f e + b e + λt (e) − λĥ (e) ≥ 0 and
Finally, the proof follows by observing that by setting t = n+1 2 in (9) we get (8) .
We can now prove Theorem 2. Proof of Theorem 2: To prove the first part we need we show that c(k, n + 1) ≤ c(k, n) for every n such that 2k − 2 ≥ n ≥ k. For every integern > 0 we extend the function c(·,n) to non-integer positive numbers α as follows:
, n+1), and also c(
, n + 1). Therefore
We showed that D(1) ≤ 0 and D(s) ≥ 0. Therefore D(t) ≥ 0 for every t ≥ s by the monotonicity of D(t) in t. However k ≥ we obtain the desired result since t ≥ s. If f e [n] = f e [n + 1] for some e ∈ E then c(k, n + 1) < c(k, n) by the convexity of the program (SY M ) n .
Next we show that ν(k, n) is non-increasing in n for n ≥ 2k − 1.
Proof. We need the following claim. Claim 2 (punishment lemma) Let ρ k ≥ 0 k = 1, 2, ... be an increasing sequence of real numbers. Let F :
and that
We proceed with the main proof. Let i be some arbitrary player. For every edge flow f ∈ F we define F (f ) = e∈E f e (a e kf e +b e ) and
To summarize: fix the number, k ≥ 1, of active players. Together, when we fix the number k ≥ 1 of active players, Theorems 2 and 3 imply the following structure of the function ν(k, n) for k ≤ n < ∞: It is non-negative and non-decreasing at the interval [k, 2k − 1], and it is non-increasing at the interval [2k − 1, ∞).
More information about this function is obtained for parallel routing games as is shown at the next section. For such games, if k is sufficiently large, it is proved that ν(k, n) vanishes at n = k(k+1)−1. Consequently, for n ≥ k(k +1), the value of ignorance is not positive. That is, knowledge is a desirable good.
Linear Splittable Parallel Routing Games
In this section we deal with a linear parallel congestion network,
e (x) = a e x + b e for every edge e. 1. ν(k, n) ≥ 0 for every k(k + 1) − 1 > n > k. Moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if there exists e 1 , e 2 ∈ E such that b e 1 = b e 2 .
2. ν(k, n) ≤ 0 for every n > k(k + 1) − 1. Moreover, the inequality is strict if and only if there exists e 1 , e 2 ∈ E such that b e 1 = b e 2 . 3. For n = k(k + 1) − 1, ν(k, n) = 0.
In order to prove Theorem 4 we need the following lemma:
) be a parallel linear congestion network . For every n let Γ N (n) be the associated splittable routing game with n players. Let A = e∈E 
2. f e [n] > 0 for every e ∈ E if and only if
Proof of Theorem 4: By part 2 of Lemma 4 there exists an integer T depending on N such that for every n ≥ T inequality (11) holds. Let T (N ) = T , and let n > k ≥ T (N ). Denote C = e∈E b e2 a e . We are about to prove that
where A and B are defined in the statement of Lemma 4. Since b e2 + b l 2 ≥ 2b e b l for every e, l ∈ E, AC − B 2 ≥ 0 . Moreover, AC − B 2 > 0 if and only if there exist a couple of edges,ê,l such that bê = bl. In addition k 2 + k − n − 1 is positive for n < k(k + 1) − 1, negative for n > k(k + 1) − 1 and zero otherwise. Therefore the proof of the theorem follows from (12) . We have to prove (12) . Indeed, by Lemma 4 and because (10) holds, for every e ∈ E, f e [n] = ]. Therefore,
As
and
Since ν(k, n) = (14) + (15) we obtain that ν(k, n) =
follows.
In an unsplittable routing game a player cannot split her unit, and therefore she has to choose a single route that connects her source to her target. Unsplittable routing games are a special type of congestion games as defined by [17] . Therefore, by [17] each such game has a pure strategy equilibrium. However, a symmetric equilibrium in a symmetric unsplittable routing game cannot, in general, be pure. Hence, in general, an unsplittable symmetric routing game will have more than one equilibrium profile, and moreover, it can be easily verified that it would have more than one equilibrium cost. Hence, the existence of a unique equilibrium cost, which was crucial for our analysis of the value of ignorance in the splittable model is not guaranteed in the unsplittable model. One can hope that when restricting attention only to symmetric (necessarily mixed-action) equilibrium we will have a unique equilibrium cost. This is indeed our conjecture. However, we have been able to prove this conjecture only for parallel unsplittable routing games. Therefore, in what follows we will deal only with parallel routing games. Parallel routing games are also called, for obvious reasons, resource selection games, and we will refer to them with the later name.
Equilibrium in Resource Selection Games with Complete Information
Let N = (G, d) be a parallel congestion network. The graph G is practically defined by the set of parallel edges E = {1, 2, · · · , m}. Therefore we will use the notation N = (E, d). Every edge j ∈ E is called a resource. When we dealt with splittable models we assumed that every cost function d j is defined over [0, ∞) and it is positive, increasing, convex and continuously differentiable. When dealing with unsplittable models we assume d j is defined only for positive integers, and that it is increasing and non-negative. Let I be a set of n players. Let Γ N (I) be the unsplittable parallel routing game defined by N and I, which we call a resource selection game.
The action set of every player i in Γ N (I) is the set of resources E. For every profile of resources x ∈ E n let σ j (x) be the number of all players i ∈ I for which
) be the cost of player i when the players use the resource profile x.
Let p ∈ ∆(E) be a mixed action of an arbitrary player. That is, p = (p 1 , · · · , p m ), where p j is the probability that a player who uses the mixed action p will select resource j. We denote the support of p by supp(p). That is supp(p) = {j ∈ E|p j > 0}. Denote by c n (p, j) the expected cost of a player that chooses resource j when each of the other n − 1 players in Γ N (I) is using p. Let c n (p) be the expected cost of every player when each of the n players in Γ N (I) is choosing p.
For every n ≥ 1, and for every 0
where E stands for the expectation operator. That is,
Let (q, · · · , q) ∈ ∆(E) n be a symmetric mixed-action equilibrium profile in Γ N (I). We will refer to q as a symmetric-equilibrium mixed action.
Theorem 5. Every resource selection game with at least two players and with increasing 15 resource cost functions possesses a unique symmetric mixed-action equilibrium.
In order to prove Theorem 5 we need some preparations.
The following lemma is well known, and is left as an exercise to the reader.
Lemma 5. Let n ≥ 1. F n α (k) is a strictly decreasing function of α for every 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1.
In the following lemma we show that if all players choose the same mixed action, then the expected cost for a player that uses resource j is increasing with the probability that resource j is given by the players.
exists a common prior distribution over the number of active players, and players wish to minimize their expected costs.
A central related topic that was studied extensively in the last decade is the "price of anarchy", namely the ratio between the social cost in a worst equilibrium and the optimal social cost (see e.g. [18, 11] ). Intuitively the larger this number is, the more "social cost" is lost due to selfish behavior. The price of anarchy has been studied under a complete information setting. As our results suggest, one way to reduce the price of anarchy but still allow selfish behavior is to "make sure" the number of active participants remains unknown. In this paper we do not quantify the exact amount (nor give an upper bound) on how much players gain from not knowing the number of participants. We leave this as an intriguing open problem.
Other directions to proceed are:
-Assume players adopt other qualitative decision criteria, such as minmax regret. -Assume players have different upper bounds on the number of active players. -Study different types of incomplete information, e.g., assume the edge cost functions are not common knowledge.
10 Appendix -The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
In this section we describe the relevant theory of the Karush-KuhnTucker (KKT) conditions that is required in our proofs. The material is taken from [4] . Consider the following problem:
(IC) min{f (x) : g j (x) ≤ 0, j = 1, ..., m, h k (x) = 0, k = 1, ..., p, x i ≥ 0, i = 1, .., n, x ∈ R n }.
We say that (IC) is a convex program if f, g 1 , ..., g m are real valued convex and differentiable functions on n , and h 1 , ..., h p are linear. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) Theorem: Let (IC) be a convex program and let x * be a feasible solution to (IC). If there existsx ∈ R n + such that atx the nonlinear g j are strictly negative, and linear g j are non-positive then the KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for x * to be optimal for (IC).
